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Summary
Order in the semi-public domain – private and public-
private regulation in a legal perspective
Scope and research questions
This research concerns plural policing and the regulation of order and security in
the semi-public domain. The semi-public domain covers the places that are accessi‐
ble to the public but which are controlled by private entities. Shopping malls,
public transport, bars and sports events are examples of such places. The semi-
public domain is important for people because it provides access to basic necessi‐
ties and social resources. However, peaceful enjoyment of the amenities and serv‐
ices in this domain are not always guaranteed. Misconduct and nuisance during
football matches, aggression in public transport and theft in shopping areas are
examples of threats to the wellbeing and security of people visiting and working in
the semi-public domain.
Responsibility for order and security in the semi-public domain is shared between
public and private actors. Primarily, the private entity managing the specific semi-
public space is responsible for the affairs in its establishment or during the event.
In order to prevent nuisance and criminal behaviour, the private manager can set
behavioural rules and organise surveillance to monitor compliance. In case of mis‐
conduct, the private manager may impose sanctions such as fines or exclusion
orders. The process by which norms are established, monitored and enforced I
refer to as ‘regulation’ throughout this book.
Significantly, private regulation of order and security in the semi-public domain
does not release the government from its (legal) responsibilities. The government is
still involved, in different capacities. On a local community level, it is the legal obli‐
gation and task of the Mayor to maintain public order. This task stretches out to all
domains which are accessible to the public, even if such places are in private con‐
trol. The public prosecutor is responsible for prosecuting criminal conduct wher‐
ever it takes place.
In reality, public and private actors co-operate on a voluntary basis and on a local
level they have adopted a mutual approach to combat nuisance, crimes and other
misconduct. The core of such Public Private Partnerships (PPP) is that parties
retain their own identity and responsibility. Private parties use their private law
instruments to regulate order and the government uses public powers. PPP is usu‐
ally formalised in a covenant: an agreement of which the exact legal status and
binding force is unclear.
The shared legal responsibilities for order and security in the semi-public domain
and the PPP led to a pluralistic system of different types of public and private
regulation. From a legal perspective the following questions are relevant. To what
extent does the public have a right to access such places? What legal conditions
should private managers have to take into account when imposing restrictions on
the personal liberties of visitors and regarding access to their domain? This
research examines how private regulation in the semi-public domain relates to
property and contract law doctrine and how this relates to public order and crimi‐
nal law. Furthermore, it assesses whether co-operation with the government in a
PPP influences the applicability of the legal framework. Lastly, questions about
accountability are raised: are there sufficient legal mechanisms to prevent abuse of
public and private powers in this area?
Behavioural contracts and property rights as a legal basis for private
regulation
The first stage of this research was to examine the legal basis of the various instru‐
ments used to regulate order in the semi-public domain. Case study research for
three particular types of places – football matches, shopping and nightlife areas
and public transportation – provided useful information on the mechanisms used
in practice. It appears behavioural rules used to monitor compliance and sanctions
rely primarily on legal contracts. Conclusion of a contract is especially clear when a
visitor of a semi-public place or event purchases an entrance ticket. By purchasing
the ticket the visitor willingly agrees to the general terms and conditions, including
behavioural rules and prescribed sanctions in case of breach. In other cases a con‐
tract can be made when the private manager opens his place to the general public
under certain conditions prescribed in the house rules that are published at the
door. If a visitor enters such place, he agrees to these house rules and I argued
these rules then qualify as contractual terms. I call this type of contract an (implied)
hospitality contract. A secondary legal basis can be found in property rights. The
exclusive nature of the right to property enables the entitled user to set behavioural
rules, monitor compliance and impose sanctions on people who are granted access
and use the property.
Besides explicit behavioural rules that are prescribed in contractual terms and con‐
ditions or house rules, an unwritten behavioural standard to act as a ‘good visitor’
is implied. This standard can be derived from the Dutch legal doctrine of reasona‐
bleness and equity which also exists in property law and tort law. Good visitorship
implies that visitors should not intentionally cause harm or danger to the property
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rights and physical integrity of the manager and other visitors in a reasonable
manner.
General terms and house rules may contain terms on sanctions and measures in
cases of misconduct. A well-known example is the football stadium ban which the
Royal Dutch Football Association imposes in case of football related misconduct
based on its general terms. A property owner may also invoke the exclusivity of
his property rights in order to deny others access and use of his property, in the
form of barring an individual from a stadium, shopping area or public bar, disco‐
theque or restaurant. If this exclusion order or ban is imposed by the private mana‐
ger for other semi-public places as well – e.g. all stadiums in the Netherlands or all
shops in the city centre – this is called a collective exclusion order. Shop-owners,
hospitality entrepreneurs and football clubs work together to achieve such collec‐
tive exclusion. The legal basis for collective exclusion is unclear. At best it resem‐
bles either representation in the broad sense or a bundling of the freedom to not
conclude new (hospitality) contracts with this particular person.
General terms and conditions sometimes include penalty clauses. This is the legal
basis for imposing a fine for misconduct. In addition to this, in the Netherlands the
so-called ‘Nuisance Donation’ was created in order to directly hold a shoplifter lia‐
ble for damages caused by the arrest. When a shoplifter is caught red-handed, the
shop owner presents a declaration of liability to the individual. If the shoplifter
signs this form, the damages – a fixed amount of €181 as compensation for loss of
time – can be demanded without a court order. This instant penalty payment is
also referred to as a ‘direct liability settlement’.
Additional state regulation
The case study on the regulation of order in public transport showed dissimilarity
when compared to the other cases. In this domain the Passenger Transport Act
2000 provides specific additional behavioural rules for passengers and appropriate
enforcement measures for public transport providers. Since the liberalisation and
privatisation of public transport in the Netherlands in the 1990s, these providers
are regarded as private parties. According to this Act it is primarily the task of the
public transport providers to care for ‘order, security, peace and good business
operations’. This statutory duty does not relieve the Mayor from his task to main‐
tain public order in cases of disruption. Despite the elaborate legal framework in
the Passenger Transport Act 2000, I have argued that the relationship between the
provider and passenger is primarily one of a private law nature. This so-called
‘transport contract’ is concluded between the provider and passenger as soon as
the passenger enters the vehicle.
Under the transport contract, the provider is obliged to transport the passenger,
whilst the passenger is obliged to pay for this service. In this legal relationship, the
provider is legally entitled to propose additional behavioural rules and monitor
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compliance, in a similar way as described for football clubs, shops and bars via
house rules and general terms and conditions. The aim of the Passenger Transport
Act 2000 however is to harmonize certain aspects of such self-regulation by differ‐
ent providers, such as the amount of the fine imposed in case of dodging ticket
payment. The fixed rate of €50 favours passengers because it means providers can‐
not arbitrarily vary and impose much higher fines as they see fit for this type of
offence. The legal basis for any fine is still the contract. However, I believe the trav‐
el and station ban has a different nature. This sanction is primarily based on article
98 of the Passenger Transport Act 2000 and not the transport contract. This type of
exclusion order must be considered of public nature.
Motives of the private manager to institute a private security policy
Several public and private interests are intertwined in plural policing in the semi-
public domain: the social interests of order and security; economic interests; funda‐
mental interests; and legitimate interests of adequate access to certain public servi‐
ces. The private manager primarily serves his own interests: his private security
regulation is aimed at preventing harm to property and reputation and keeping the
staff and visitors free from harm while avoiding liability. Private managers have
also a legal duty to keep the public in their domain safe and protect them from
breaches of personal integrity. This ‘duty of proper supervision’ is derived from
tort law jurisprudence together with the supplementary doctrine of reasonableness
and equity. The scope of this duty depends on the nature of the services and activi‐
ties that the manager provides and the predictability of the risks. Furthermore,
certain security measures may be prescribed in the public law licence which the
manager needs for his business. Hence, private managers not only have certain
personal interests when designing and executing an adequate security policy, they
also have a legal obligation to do so. However, I believe it is not adequate to qual‐
ify private policing as performing a public task –as some authors have – because
their actions are too closely related to their own, legitimate, private law interests
and duties.
The protection of fundamental rights and private regulation
Private regulation of order in the semi-public domain affects personal liberties of
visitors. Monitoring by means of searching clothes and bags, camera surveillance
and data collection touch upon privacy rights of the visitors. An exclusion order
imposes restrictions on the freedom of movement in parts of the public domain.
Even though visitors have a legitimate interest in preventing harm and contribu‐
ting to order and security, these interests cannot justify all restrictions of visitors’
personal liberties. In particular, the fundamental right to equal treatment and non-
discrimination is of great importance. Profiling may lead to the undesirable situ‐
624 Orde in het semipublieke domein
ation where marginalized groups in society may have limited opportunity to enjoy
the semi-public domain.
In their interplay, both legislator and courts aim at ensuring thriving commercial
exchange where people can enjoy their civil liberties. The state can be regarded as
the ‘guardian of fundamental rights’, also in horizontal relations, because of its
obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights and EU law. I have
selected three reasons for (indirect) application of human rights in private law rela‐
tionships in the semi-public domain. The first reason is the presence of a position
of (economic) power producing an imbalance in bargaining power, dependency
and limited ability to negotiate the terms of the contract as a the result. Second, if
one party provides a public service or tends to public policy goals this may also
justify application of human rights. Last, some human rights are considered to be
of fundamental nature and their application is not limited to vertical relations but
stretch out to all legal relationships. Besides legislative and judicial indirect effect,
human rights can be safeguarded by public authority– e.g. the Mayor – in PPP and
by private parties in the form of self-regulation.
Legal framework in cases of private security regulation
Various legal doctrines have been analysed in order to reach conclusions on the
legal admissibility of private law instruments which are being used to regulate
order in the semi-public domain The legal framework consists primarily of general
private law, since the relationship between the private manager of a semi-public
place and the public is a private law relationship based on a contract or property
rights. In addition to this public laws on non-discrimination and privacy are appli‐
cable to private law relationships to some extent. The analysis of the applicability
of these private and public law doctrines in this specific domain and specific condi‐
tions together with the ratio of the rules has led to a broad legal framework. A
study on lower court decisions on private regulation of security and similar mat‐
ters provided insight into how the framework and the different factors are applied
in court. In this framework the following principles can be distinguished.
First of all, foreseeability of private security regulations is of utmost importance.
Does the public reasonably know beforehand what behaviour is expected and how
these rules will be enforced? If private security policy is based on a contract, the
general idea is that visitors have agreed to the conditions of their own free will.
The relevant question is to what extent this agreement is based on informed consent.
If consent is based on unclear, incorrect or incomplete information, I suggest the
use of restrictive private law instruments has a degree of coercion and does not
comply with the basic nature of private law instruments. Governmental use of
coercion is considered legitimate if based on a law passed by a democratic body.
The idea of a social contract and representation solves the legitimacy problem. In
private law relations this is not the case. Private parties are only able to use some
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degree of coercion within limits of the ‘consent’ provided, of free will and based on
the information at the time of consent or within the limits of their property rights.
An illustrative example in this regard is the search of clothes and bags at the
entrance of football events and in the nightlife sector. This can be considered a pri‐
vacy-sensitive search and visitors may refuse to co-operate. The search is based on
consent and therefore different from the mandatory stop and searches the govern‐
ment may impose in the public domain. However, if co-operation is refused, the
private manager has the right to refuse access to his domain on basis of security
and prevention of harm. This means visitors who wish access feel the urge to co-
operate and consent to the search. I have argued in this book that this consent can
only be considered to be informed consent if the search is foreseeable and has been
intimated in advance. Then, visitors can leave private and sensitive objects at
home. In order to prevent discrimination and ethnic profiling, the search must also
be conducted consistently and the manager must be able to explain what specific
and foreseeable risks he is aiming to eliminate. The search must be adequate to
actually eliminate this risk. My recommendation is to codify these rules due to the
fundamental importance of privacy and particularly since private searches are
broadly used in the semi-public domain.
However, even where private security policy is foreseeable, a remaining problem
is that the public has virtually no real negotiation power to change the terms.
Entrance tickets and hospitality contracts are adhesion contracts – take it or leave
it. Also, some managers hold a position of economic superiority. This is the case for
football in which the Royal Dutch Football Association is a monopolistic entity and
in public transportation where providers, due to their concession, have a regional
monopoly. To compensate this inequality in the contract, I propose that the courts
should adopt a dynamic attitude when assessing the fairness of non-negotiable
contractual terms.
With regard to private (collective) exclusion orders, I derived legal boundaries
from the equitable doctrine of reasonableness and fairness; prohibition of abuse of
power; tort law; the right to equal treatment and non-discrimination; and the right
to privacy. The legitimacy of excluding a visitor in the case of (threatening) mis‐
conduct can be determined by balancing the interests of the parties involved as
well as general interests. I contend that the public nature and social function of a
specific place in the semi-public domain needs to be taken into account. This leads
to the basic principle that a private manager of a semi-public place may not
exclude others without legitimate reason. Prevention of nuisance, disorder, crimes
and other harm may be a legitimate reason, but the manager must explain what
disruption exactly was caused by this particular person or which threats are actua‐
lly still plausible, based on the facts. If exclusion is used to sanction past behaviour,
the length and range of the ban must relate to the gravity of the disruption and the
culpability. Furthermore, the availability of alternatives, the defamatory effect and
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possible deficiencies in the implementation of the ban are relevant factors in the
assessment of the legitimacy of a private (collective) exclusion order.
Different types of government involvement
The case studies show that the government is always to a greater or lesser extent
involved in policing the semi-public domain. Governmental control is aimed at
contributing to various public interests, such as prevention of vigilantism, protec‐
tion of citizen liberties and securing the accessibility of certain public services and
social resources. Government enforced behavioural rules in the form of criminal law
and administrative law constitute legal order and prevent chaos. These laws have
an expressive nature – it is clear what type of behaviour is socially and legally dis‐
couraged. Additionally, these laws serve the legitimacy of governmental control,
because they prescribe competences which the government can use to enforce the
rules.
On a local level, it is the legal task of the local Mayor to care for public order in a
broad sense. With regard to the semi-public domain, three types of involvement
can be distinguished. Firstly, the Mayor monitors the exploitation of the semi-
public domain. The most important instrument is licensing public events and estab‐
lishments, by which the Mayor is able to perform a preventive impact assessment
of the safety of the proposed activities and has regulatory power to propose certain
restrictions and revoke the licence in cases of (threatening) public order problems.
For public transport, the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment plays a simi‐
lar role. Secondly, the Mayor is competent to act in instances of emergent public
disorder, even when this occurs in the semi-public domain. The Mayor is able to
impose immediate orders or even close down a public event or establishment. The
available remedies under traditional public order law can be characterised as a
safety net: if the private manager is unable or unwilling to maintain order in his
semi-public domain, the Mayor can and will step in. Thirdly, in addition to the
police and prosecutor, the Mayor co-operates in PPP’s alongside private parties to
contribute to a specific security issue on a voluntary basis. I will describe this
dimension of governmental control hereafter.
Legal framework in PPP
PPP is formalized in covenants, in which parties agree to use their own (legal)
instruments to contribute to order and security in the semi-public domain. A key
feature in these partnerships is that parties keep their own legal identities: gover‐
nmental actors use their public law instruments and private parties use their pri‐
vate law instruments. This type of PPP is in accordance with the principle of lega‐
lity, since the covenants do not involve extra competencies for private actors.
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Since PPP does not involve a transfer of legal authority, the above described legal
framework is also applicable to private actors who participate in a PPP and orga‐
nize their private order and security accordingly. Even though they actively parti‐
cipate in policing and crime control, they are not obliged to respect human rights,
principles of good governance and criminal law safeguards in the same way as a
government does. However, private law, to some extent, contains standards that
provide similar mechanisms to prevent abuse of power. Also, co-operation largely
consists of the public-private exchange of intelligence and personal data of visitors.
Co-operating private parties are subject to specialized public legislation on data
protection.
PPP makes it possible for all participating members – public and private – to access
shared intelligence and base their sanctions on this. This leads to the situation in
which an alleged perpetrator faces private law sanctions, administrative measures
and criminal prosecution. Under current (Dutch) law nothing stands in the way of
this accumulation. Private law sanctions fall outside the scope of the principle of
double jeopardy (also referred to as the ne bis in idem principle). Different admini‐
strative public order measures may be combined with prosecution, as long as the
public order measures are indeed aimed at restoration of order en prevention of
further disorder. They may not exclusively have a punitive effect. I have postu‐
lated that the proportionality principle, however, still requires that there is a reaso‐
nable relationship between all combined measures and sanctions and the gravity of
the misconduct underlying these sanctions. This is especially important if accumu‐
lation of sanctions results from and is made possible because of a PPP.
Fragmentation of accountability in case of PPP
Accountability is a key component of regulation. It entails the basic idea of provi‐
ding information, explaining and justifying one’s actions to another body. Regula‐
tors need to show how they perform their given tasks in order to prevent and/or
redress abuse of their regulatory powers. From a legal perspective, regulators
should be held accountable for the lawfulness of their policy design and practical
use of their instruments. An analysis of all available (legal) remedies to hold regu‐
latory bodies – public and private – accountable for execution of their regulations
in the context of security in the semi-public domain shows a fragmented system. In
the phase of designing and executing regulation, the co-operating partners made
an effort to integrate their approaches due to reasons of efficiency but this is not
the case in the phase of accountability. All different sanctions can be checked by
different courts and complaints committees, which use different criteria in their
review.
The risk of fragmented and diffuse accountability is that all actors hide behind the
autonomy of the others. Moreover, the different fora and criteria are too narrowly
interpreted to serve as an adequate check for the use of powers by the network as a
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whole. I consider the fragmented accountability problematic regarding accumula‐
tion of sanctions, especially when this is the result of PPP. In the different procedu‐
res, the accumulative effect of PPP and proportionality of the result is rarely part of
the review.
In this regard, I see added value in integral complaints committees, in which both
public and private actors partake alongside representatives of the public. Since
exchanging information is a key feature in this process, I believe an integral com‐
mittee could check the processing of information to secure data protection safe‐
guards and provide the person involved a chance to explain in an amenable and
inexpensive procedure. Especially if this check is available at an early stage, this
could contribute to procedural justice. I believe an integral committee could thrive
if independence is guaranteed and if the formation, assessment frameworks and
procedures are transparent. Concerning court procedures, I recommend inclusion
of an applicable proportionality test for concurrent and cumulative legal procedu‐
res and – if there is reason to in specific cases – judicial authority to adjust their
sentence accordingly.
If possible, the above changes should be realized by co-operating public and pri‐
vate parties themselves in their covenants. This type of horizontal governance is
preferable to unilateral government legislation. However, if self-regulation does
not lead to the desirable level of accountability, the legislature must step up. This
fits the theory of anchored pluralism: the normative idea that in complex public-pri‐
vate networks, the state must take it upon itself to function as an anchor and secure
equal access to public services, public interests in society, protection of human
rights and procedural justice.
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